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The Rwandan genocide triggered a vast number of criminal and quasi-criminal prose-
cutions.  Rwanda therefore constitutes an example of a robust and rapid implementa-
tion of criminal accountability for atrocity. Rwanda, moreover, departed from other 
countries – such as South Africa – by eschewing a truth and reconciliation process as 
part of a transitional justice process. This chapter unpacks three levels of judicializa-
tion that promoted criminal responsibility for atrocity in Rwanda: the ICTR, special-
ized chambers of national courts, and gacaca proceedings. The ICTR indicted roughly 
90 individuals, the national courts convicted in the area of 10,000 defendants (with 
some proceedings remaining ongoing), while approximately one million individuals 
proceeded through gacaca. The ICTR and gacaca proceedings have been concluded for 
several years already.  This article summarizes these proceedings, discusses the out-
comes and assesses their impact. In addition, this article examines how these three 
layers of judicialization interfaced with each other.
Keywords
trials – genocide –  international criminal law – sentences – convictions – crimes 
against humanity
1 Parts of this chapter draw from, condense, and update the author’s prior publications Atroc-
ity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) (specifically pages 
71–96) and “Justice Outside of Criminal Courtrooms and Jailhouses”, in Arcs of Global Justice 
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1 Introduction
Between April and July 1994, approximately 500,000 to 800,000 people were 
massacred in genocidal pogroms in Rwanda. This is a staggering amount of 
death in a country with a total population at the time of around 8 million. Many 
of the killings were unspeakably brutal. They were in no way depersonalized 
through technology: a study conducted by the Rwandan government  concluded 
that nearly 38% of victims were murdered by machete, 16.8% by club, and 
14.8% by firearm; other means of murder included grenades, swords, knives, 
drowning, sticks, rock, and barehanded assault.2
The perpetrators of the violence were members of the majority Hutu ethnic 
group, many of whom were ordinary citizens radicalized by an extremist 
 government. The overwhelming majority of victims were members of the 
 minority Tutsi group. The Hutu comprised approximately 85% of Rwanda’s 
population, the Tutsi 14%. The genocide was quelled when a Tutsi army (the 
rpa), based in neighboring Uganda, ousted the genocidal Hutu government 
and seized power in July 1994. The rpa’s General, Paul Kagame, currently serves 
as Rwanda’s Head of State.
William Schabas notes that in the many years that have ensued Rwanda “in-
sisted upon holding perpetrators accountable […] while many other post- 
conflict societies have delayed, postponed and even prevaricated.”3 As a result 
of this commitment, Rwanda instituted national trials within chambers spe-
cially established within the regular court system and, subsequently, proceed-
ings within neo-traditional venues called gacaca for genocide. The interna-
tional community, for its part, formally prosecuted higher-ranked offenders at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr), sited in Arusha (Tan-
zania). A handful of states foreign to Rwanda also conducted national proceed-
ings, at times based on principles of universal jurisdiction, against Rwandan 
nationals who generally shared some connection to those states.
In short, the Rwandan genocide has triggered a vast number of criminal and 
quasi-criminal prosecutions. While redress for Holocaust-era crimes of the 
1940’s continues to be an ongoing pursuit, including against defendants aged in 
their nineties, accountability in the sense of penal proceedings for Rwanda’s 
genocide has largely wrapped up. The little country of Rwanda, then, repre-
sents a robust and rapid implementation of criminal accountability for atroc-
ity. Rwanda, moreover, departed from other countries, such as South Africa, by 
2 Dénombrement Des Victims Du Genocide: Rapport Final, Ministère de l’Admin istration 
locale, de l’Information, et des Affaires sociales 26 (2002).
3 W A Schabas, ‘Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda: A Spectrum of Options’ in P Clark and Z D 
Kaufman (eds), After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recon-
ciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (cup 2009) 207.
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eschewing a truth and reconciliation process as part of a transitional justice 
process.
This chapter unpacks three levels of judicialization that promoted criminal 
responsibility for atrocity in Rwanda. To recap, these three layers are: the ictr, 
specialized chambers of national courts, and gacaca proceedings. The ictr 
indicted roughly 90 individuals, the national courts convicted in the area of 
10,000  defendants (with some proceedings remaining ongoing), while roughly 
one million individuals proceeded through gacaca. The ictr and gacaca pro-
ceedings have been concluded for several years already. This chapter will not 
 discuss a fourth level, namely, the handful of proceedings conducted extrater-
ritorially – for example, in Canada, Belgium, France, and Germany.4
Rwanda’s domestic pursuit of extensive criminal prosecutions in the after-
math of genocide is all the more remarkable in light of the absolute  destruction 
that the genocide wrought to the country’s legal system and legal profession. 
Schabas was among the first foreign experts to arrive in Rwanda in the wake of 
the genocide. He recalls:
In September 1994, Rwanda’s then-Minister of Justice, Alphonse-Marie 
Nkubito, working from an office whose windows had been knocked out, 
and whose walls were decorated only by gunshots, appealed to the inter-
national community for assistance in rebuilding the country’s devastated 
justice system. […] There were only around 20 lawyers with genuine legal 
education in the country when I visited Rwanda in November 1994 as 
part of the international response to Minister Nkubito’s appeal.5
I worked as a public defender in Kigali, Rwanda’s capital, in 1998. At the time, 
nearly 130,000 detainees accused of genocide-related crimes were crammed 
into prisons with the capacity to hold about 15,000. I worked in a prison that 
housed approximately 9,000 suspects. At the time, here’s how I described the 
setting:
They [the prisoners] stand, sit and sleep in one courtyard. Overcrowding 
is so pronounced that one had to step over and on bodies in order to cross 
to the other side of the courtyard. Bunkbeds layered on top of each other 
finger the sky, hooked together with clothes lines from which the 
4 Discussion can be found at Helen L. Trouille, “France, Universal Jurisdiction and Rwandan 
génocidaires: The Simbikangwa Trial”, 14:1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016) pp. 
195–217; Leila Sadat, “Transjudicial Dialogue and the Rwandan Genocide: Aspects of Antago-
nism and Complementarity”, 22:3 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 543–562.
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 prisoners’ pink correctional uniforms hang. Between the beds narrow 
pathways wind through the congestion.6
The massive nature of the genocide, and the staggering number of geno-
cide suspects, did more than, to draw from Hannah Arendt, “explode the lim-
its  of law”,7 they also exploded the capacity of whatever infrastructure that 
remained.
Schabas was a catalyst in developing the domestic Organic Law that ulti-
mately would form the basis for prosecutions for genocide and crimes against 
humanity in the specialized chambers of the national court system.8 To be 
sure, the many proceedings conducted thereunder oozed with due process 
concerns; their contribution to reconciliation, moreover, is unclear. Notwith-
standing these limitations, Rwanda’s attempts to thwart impunity, develop an 
historical record, and promote accountability in the wake of a genocide that 
implicated broad swaths of the population as perpetrators represents for Scha-
bas “one of the most principled manifestations of the commitment of interna-
tional human rights law and policy”.9 While Schabas’ endorsement may tend 
towards the optimistic, and contrasts with others who take a dimmer view,10 
the fact remains that Rwanda took post-conflict justice very seriously. This 
Chapter unpacks these modalities of post-conflict genocide justice in 
Rwanda.
2 The ictr
The United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr) through Resolution 955 in November 1994. The 
Security Council elected to site the ictr in Arusha (Tanzania). Rwanda, then a 
member of the Security Council, did not support the ictr in part because of 
its location outside Rwanda and because it could not award the death penalty 
as a sentence.
6 Mark A. Drumbl, “Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s 
Domestic Genocide Trials”, 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 545, 572 (1998).
7 Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence 1926–1969, New York, hbj, 1992, p. 54.
8 In Rwanda, the term “Organic Law” refers to laws that rank higher in normativity to ordi-
nary laws, and are secondary only to the Constitution.
9 Schabas, supra note 3, at 207.
10 See, e.g. Lars Waldorf and Scott Strauss (eds), Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Hu-
man Rights After Mass Violence (University of Wisconsin Press 2011).
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The ictr has primacy over national institutions. It has jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.11 The ictr has sentenced 
59 of its 90 indictees. Seventeen of these are life sentences. In Nchamihigo, an 
ictr Trial Chamber held that:
[A] sentence of life imprisonment is generally reserved for those who 
planned or ordered atrocities and those who participated in the crimes 
with especial zeal or sadism. Offenders receiving the most severe sen-
tences also tend to be senior authorities.12
The ictr Appeals Chamber in Nchamihigo (a defendant who had been a dep-
uty prosecutor, so not a senior authority within the government) ultimately 
reversed some of the convictions and substituted a term sentence of 40 years. 
Life sentences however, have been routinely imposed against senior govern-
ment authorities, along with persons who did not hold government positions. 
Examples include a tea factory director, and a high-level official in the Intera-
hamwe militia – a group of zealots who supported the genocidal cause with 
avidity and committed many horrendous massacres.
Among the ictr’s 42 determinate sentences, the median sentence is 25 years 
and the mean sentence is 24.67 years.13 The shortest determinate sentence issued 
by the ictr is 6 years, while the maximum is 47 years. In addition, at the ictr, 14 
individuals have been acquitted, 5 referred to national jurisdictions for trial, 2 
deceased prior to or during trial, and 2 indictments withdrawn before trial.
Article 23(1) of the ictr Statute, which limits penalty to imprisonment, 
stipulates that, in determining the terms of imprisonment, the ictr shall have 
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of 
Rwanda. The ictr has concluded that although it has an obligation to consider 
such practice, this provision does not imply an obligation to conform thereto.14 
No obligation arises to take into account the sentencing practice of  national 
11 Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Internation-
al  Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
 Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, Between Jan. 1, 1994 and Dec. 31, 1994. S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994).
12 The Prosecutor v. Siméon Nchamihigo ictr-01-63-T (Judgment, 12 November 2008), para. 
388.
13 All of the ictr data are compiled and analyzed by Professor Barbora Holá (Free Univer-
sity of Amsterdam) and shared with the author on January 7, 2017 (results on file with the 
author).
14 The Prosecutor v. Semanza ictr-97-20-A (Judgement, 20 May 2005), paras. 345, 347, 377; 
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jurisdictions other than Rwanda.15 Although sentences in similar  cases ad-
judicated at the ictr are instructive, these antecedents are not binding as 
benchmarks.16 When it comes to determining sentence, ictr judges took 
into account “the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of 
the convicted person.”17 A convict may be incarcerated for a term up to life. 
Since there is no mandatory minimum sentence, ictr judges therefore have 
the power to impose any sentence ranging from one-day imprisonment to life 
imprisonment for any crime within their jurisdiction. In the initial years of its 
work, the ictr sentenced somewhat erratically. Greater consistency emerged 
over time,18 at least in the case of the identification of principles to guide grav-
ity and individualization of sentence. D’Ascoli concludes that among the most 
influential factors in the quantum of sentence are the type of crime, the vic-
timization, superior position of the convict, and abuse of authority.19
ictr trials have raised international awareness of what happened in Rwanda 
in 1994 and have developed an historical record. Far more muddied is the evi-
dence that ictr trials have contributed to reconciliation in the country. ictr 
jurisprudence certainly has advanced and clarified numerous aspects of inter-
national criminal law. This jurisprudential contributon is significant. For exam-
ple, the Akayesu decision provided a sophisticated definition of ethnicity (for 
the purposes of proving genocide) and also advanced a progressive understand-
ing of sexual violence in which rape was constructed as a tool of genocide.20 The 
Musema decision extended command responsibility outside of the military 
context and into a private corporate environment.21 In Barayagwiza, the ictr 
issued the first verdict ever to media leaders for inciting genocide and differenti-
ated statements of ethnic pride (protected by virtue of freedom of expression) 
from incitement to hate (not protected by freedom of expression).22 The 
15 Bikindi v. The Prosecutor ictr-01-72-A (Judgement, 18 March 2010), para. 154.
16 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al. ictr-98-42-T (Trial Judgement and Sentence, 24 June 
2011), para. 6190.
17 Statute of the ictr, supra note 11, article 23(2).
18 Silvia D’Ascoli, Sentencing in International Criminal Law (Hart 2011); Barbora Holá, Catrien 
Bijleveld and Alette Smeulers, ‘Consistency of International Sentencing: icty and ictr 
Case Study’ (2012) 9 European Journal of Criminology 539–52; Kai Ambos, Treatise on Inter-
national Criminal Law – Volume ii (Oxford University Press 2014) 268; Barbora Holá, 
Alette Smeulers and Catrien Bijleveld, ‘International Sentencing Fact and Figures: Sen-
tencing Practice at the icty and ictr’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
411–39.
19 D’Ascoli, supra note 18, at 259–60.
20 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ictr-96-4 (ictr Appeals Chamber, 2001, affirming judg-
ment of ictr Trial Chamber).
21 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ictr-96-13-T (ictr Appeals Chamber, Nov. 16, 2001).
22 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ictr-99-52-T (ictr Trial 
Chamber, Dec. 3, 2003).
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 Nyiramasuhuko case involved one of the first convictions of a woman for geno-
cide and crimes against humanity, including on charged of ordering mass rape.23
The ictr has wound down its activities. The International Residual Mecha-
nism for Criminal Tribunals (unmict), a separately created entity, picks up 
the outstanding work, including criminal proceedings. The unmict assumed 
responsibility for the supervision of all sentences pronounced by the ictr as 
of 1 July 2012, including the process of early release of convicts. The ictr deliv-
ered its last trial judgment on 20 December 2012, in the Ngirabatware case.24 Its 
last Appeals Judgement was delivered in December 2015 in the Nyiramasuhuko 
case. ictr and unmict sentences are enforced in States that have signed co-
operation agreements and in accordance with international standards of de-
tention and the applicable law of the enforcing State. ictr convicts have for 




The 1996 Organic Law, which generated the legal basis for prosecutions in the 
national and military courts of Rwanda for genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, initially created four categories of culpability.25 These were: (a) Cate-
gory 1 (planners, organizers, those in positions of authority, notorious murders 
(with zeal or excessive malice), sexual torturers and rapists); (b) Category 2 
(perpetrators of intentional homicide or serious bodily assault causing death); 
(c) Category 3 (perpetrators of other serious assaults); and (d) Category 4 (per-
petrators of property offenses). War crimes were excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of the Organic Law.
Article 14 of the initial Organic Law dealt with punishment. It linked the  severity 
of punishment, as well as its form, to the gravity of the offense as  represented or-
dinally by the category of culpability. Category 1 offenses,  initially sanctioned by 
death, became punished by life imprisonment after Rwanda’s abrogation of the 
23 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al. ictr-98-42-A (ictr Appeals Chamber, December 14, 
2015).
24 The Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware ictr-99-54-T (Judgement and Sentence, 20 December 
2012).
25 Organic Law No. 8/96 on the organization of prosecutions for offenses constituting the 
crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990 (Journal 
Officiel No. 17 du Sept 1, 1996) (establishing categories of offenders, punishments, a trial 
and appellate structure, and limiting jurisdiction to events occurring from October 1, 
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death penalty in 2007. Part of this involved a dance between the ictr, whose 
judges refused to refer cases to the courts of Rwanda through the transfer mecha-
nism (having the death penalty on the books in Rwanda barred transfer), and 
national authorities in Rwanda.26 The Organic Law encouraged defendants to 
confess their guilt through a detailed guilty plea schematic.
Article 17 of the Organic Law permitted additional sanction by stripping the 
convict of certain civic rights. This could be permanent (dégradation civique 
perpétuelle et totale (sometimes referred to as défintive) or limited either in 
scope or temporal duration (dégradation civique limitée). Examples of those 
civic rights or privileges stripped through dégradation civique include: the right 
to vote; other political rights (such as to be a candidate); an inability to serve as 
an expert or witness in trials or to be deposed judicially other than for the giv-
ing of simple facts (although it has been held that proceedings from previous 
trials may be admissible);27 the right to carry arms; to serve in the armed forc-
es; to be police; and to teach or to be employed in any educational institution 
as professor, monitor, teacher, or supervisor.28
In a December 2002 report, Amnesty International compiled statistics re-
garding a total of 7,181 persons that had been ajudged in Rwanda since 1997.29 
Amnesty International found that 9.5% of defendants were sentenced to capi-
tal punishment, 27.1% to life imprisonment, 40.5% to fixed prison terms, and 
that 19.1% were acquitted. Longitudinally, the Amnesty International study 
demonstrates the following trends: decline in capital punishment sentences 
from 30% of perpetrators in 1997 to 3.4% in 2002 – with steady annual declines; 
decline in life imprisonment 32.4% in 1997 to 20.5% in 2002, and increase in 
fixed prison terms from 27.7% in 1997 to 47.2% in 2002.30 These trends arise 
from a number of factors, including that the initial trials focused on the more 
notorious killers and that with the passage of time increased recourse was 
made of guilty pleas.
I conducted a qualitative review of the published judgments (in French) of 
the Rwandan genocide courts.31 The database of judgments I reviewed was 
26 The referral of cases to Rwanda was contemplated by Rule 11bis of the ictr Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence.
27 Ministère Public v. Nteziryayo (Emmanuel) et al. (November 30, 2001, 1ière instance, Bu-
tare), rmp 44223/S8/KA, RP 84/2/2001, p. 21.
28 Ministère Public v. Kabirigi et al. (Dec 10, 1998, 1ière instance, Kibuye), rmp 51.498/S4/
C.M./KBY/97, RP Ch. Sp.005/01/97, pp 29–30. Article 66 of the Rwandan Code of Criminal 
Procedure defines dégradation civique and this definition is incorporated by the 1996 Or-
ganic Law.
29 Amnesty International, Gacaca: A question of justice 17 (December 2002) (AI In-
dex: afr 47/007/2002) (referencing Liprodhor statistics).
30 Id.
31 See Mark A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 77–80 (2007).
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compiled and maintained by Avocats sans frontières (asf) and were published 
in bound volumes and posted on line on their website.32 These judgments 
comprise a large, representative sample from across Rwanda. In the cases I re-
viewed, when aggregated, defendants received the following sentences (largely 
consonant with the Amnesty International findings): 15% death, 30% life im-
prisonment, 55% fixed terms. Among the fixed terms, I calculated the median 
term to be 11 years, and the mean term 15.25 years.
The domestic Rwandan courts identified factors to consider in quantifying 
sentence in individual cases. Aggravating factors often are assumed from the 
grisly nature of the conduct. What is more, in the Rwandan context aggravat-
ing factors already are implied in the severity of sanction insofar as the factors 
that go to identifying liability for a Category 1 offense (such as senior position, 
zeal, organizing, notoriousness, and particular brutality (méchanceté exces-
sive)) correspond to those factors that judges pursuing retributive goals could 
be expected to turn to in order to fix sentence within an entirely discretionary 
sentencing structure. My review of the early case-law reveals recourse to the 
following as mitigating factors: (a) partial, incomplete, tardy, or irregular guilty 
pleas; (b) minor status; (c) contrainte (coercion); and (d) individual character-
istics, such as that the defendant sheltered Tutsi during the genocide,33 lack of 
education,34 the defendant’s weak physical health,35 and that the defendant 
did not organize the attacks.36
3.2 Civil Sanctions
In the case of virtually all convicted defendants, specialized chambers of na-
tional courts also issued orders for restitution/compensation based on collat-
eral private lawsuits (parties civiles) filed by the victims and/or surviving family 
members. No civil damage awards could be issued if the accused had been 
32 http://www.asf.be/FR/Frameset.htm.
33 Ministère Public v. Munyangabo et al. (June 10, 1998, 1ière instance, Gikongoro), rmp 
98809/S2/MP/97 R.P. 0017/1/GIRO (“habituellement elle est d’un esprit compatissant 
comme en témoigne le fait d’avoir caché trois enfants Tutsis jusqu’à l’arrêt de la guerre.”).
34 Ministère Public v. Siborugirwa et al, (Oct. 22, 1999, 1ière instance, Gitarama); Ministère 
Public v. Sibomana et al. (Dec. 3, 1998, ch. sp. 1ière instance Rushashi), rmp 110 502/NK.A/
J.T., RP 017/S1/98.
35 Ministère Public v. Siborugirwa et al, (Oct. 22, 1999, 1ière instance, Gitarama) at pp. 14, 16.
36 Ministère Public v. Munyangabo et al. (June 10, 1998, 1ière instance, Gikongoro), rmp 
98809/S2/MP/97 R.P. 0017/1/GIRO p. 13 (“[il] n’a pas fait parti des personnes qui ont pre-
paré l’attaque”); Ministère Public v. Rukeribuga et al. (Dec. 17, 2001, 1ière instance, Kibuye), 
rmp 51336/S4/G.M./NSE/97, RP Ch.Sp. 19/01/00 (“diminution de peine car responsibilité 
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 acquitted on all charges: the awards remain contingent on a criminal convic-
tion. In theory, partie civile claims pushed in a restorative and compensatory 
direction. In light of the impecuniousness of the defendants, however, the 
awards ended up largely serving only expressive or symbolic purposes.
In one judgment, a Rwandan national court adopted a complex grid of 
damages,37 in Rwandan francs, to attach to the kinds of losses and injuries 
documented:
Moral damages:   10 million Rwanda francs for the loss of a mother or 
a father
   8 million for a child
   5 million for a sibling
    3 million for another close relative (e.g. uncle, aunt, 
nephew, niece)
Material damages:  300,000 for a cow, 20,000 for a goat, 2,000 for a chick-
en, 1,000 for a rabbit
   2 million for a house built out of wood and thatch
    5 million for a house built out of bricks with metal 
doors
   5 million for household articles
   1 million for the harvest
While moral damages refer to harms and pain arising from the loss of certain 
relatives, material damages refer to goods and property that have been pil-
laged, stolen, or destroyed. In the mid 2000’s the exchange rate for the Rwan-
dan franc to the US dollar was about 1 to 575. Hence an award of one million 
Rwandan francs amounted to approximately US $1,700 – a sum larger than the 
then per capita annual gdp in Rwanda.
The partie civile claims conveyed considerable narrative value. The text of 
the Rwandan civil judgments reads very differently than the text of the crimi-
nal judgments. The civil judgments foreground the victims rather than the 
 defendant. The storytelling is much more about the victims, the details of their 
suffering, and exactly what they lost.
37 Ministère Public v Nteziryayo (Emmanuel) et al. rmp 44223/S8/KA, RP 84/2/2001 (30 No-
vember 2001) 1 ière instance, Butare.
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4 Gacaca
Historically, gacaca was a form of local dispute resolution that percolated 
throughout Rwanda. Gacaca means “justice on the grass” in Kinyarwanda.38 
Gacaca was traditionally deployed to referee property disputes, regulate small-
scale violence, and redress conflict among neighbors. With its prisons bulging 
with suspects in the wake of the genocide, Rwanda’s government was hard 
pressed to assess how exactly to process such a large volume of individuals. 
Beginning in earnest in the mid-2000s, the government turned to gacaca to 
this end.
Traditionally gacaca was informal, local, and somewhat organic. It was also 
starkly patriarchal. The Rwandan government, however, formalized and mod-
ernized gacaca through national legislative enactments (an Organic Law, rou-
tinely amended), mandated the election of lay judges, required the participa-
tion of women, and established a detailed organizational structure. This 
transformation yielded many benefits; along the way however it also morphed 
gacaca from a restorative system to more of a retributive system. In the end, 
“gacaca for genocide” materially departed from traditional gacaca.
The Organic Law on Gacaca Jurisdictions, first enacted in 2001 and subse-
quently amended (including important amendments in 2004 and 2007), cre-
ated the gacaca tribunals and, like the 1996 Organic Law for the specialized 
chambers, limited the jurisdiction of gacaca tribunals to charges of genocide 
and crimes against humanity committed between October 1, 1990 and Decem-
ber 31, 1994.39 These laws created categories of offenders and linked punish-
ments to the specific category. In this regard, the approach was once again 
similar that of the 1996 Organic Law for the specialized chambers of national 
courts (discussed in the previous section and to which some gacaca indictees 
are referred). Article 51 of the 2004 gacaca legislation created three categories 
38 See Adrien Katherine Wing & Mark Richard Johnson, The Promise of a Post-Genocide Con-
stitution: Healing Rwandan Spirit Injuries, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 247, 280 n.321 (2002).
39 Organic Law establishing the organization, competence and functioning of Gacaca 
Courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and 
other crimes against humanity, committed between October 1st, 1990 and December 31, 
1994, Nos. 40/2000 (January 26, 2001) and 33/2001 (June 22, 2001). For amendments, see e.g. 
Organic Law No 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 modifying and complementing Organic law No 
16/2004 of 19/6/2004 establishing the organization, competence and functioning of 
 Gacaca Courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of 
 genocide and other crimes against humanity, committed between October 1st, 1990 and 




journal of international peacekeeping 22 (2018) 247-262
of offenders. Category 1 offenders were excluded from the gacaca courts.40 It 
specified prison sentences and determined their length through a detailed sen-
tencing grid. The gacaca legislation, however, also diversified sanction by in-
troducing the possibility of community service, which was made available for 
certain defendants who admitted to their crimes.41 So, for example, a convict 
could serve part of the sentence in jail, part in community service, and part 
released, albeit in suspended sentence. A very detailed schematic was set out 
in this regard. For example, Article 14 of the 2007 amendments to the Organic 
Law provided as follows:
Defendants falling within the second category referred to in the first, sec-
ond and third paragraph of article 11 of this organic law,42 who:
1° refused to confess, plead guilty, repent and apologise, or whose confes-
sions, guilt plea, repentance and apologies have been rejected, incur a 
prison sentence of thirty (30) years or life imprisonment
2° confessed, pleaded guilty, repented and apologised after being includ-
ed on the list of the accused and whose confession, guilt plea, repentance 
and apologises have been accepted, incur a prison sentence ranging from 
twenty- five (25) to twenty-nine (29) years, but:
a) they serve a third (1/3) of the sentence in custody;
b) a sixth (1/6) of the sentence is suspended;
c) half (1/2) of the sentence is commuted into community service.
3° confessed, pleaded guilty, repented and apologised before being in-
cluded on the list of the accused, incur a prison sentence ranging from 
twenty (20) to twenty-four (24) years, but:
a) they serve a sixth (1/6) of the sentence in custody;
40 Organic Law establishing the organization, competence and functioning of Gacaca 
Courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and 
other crimes against humanity, committed between October 1st, 1990 and December 31, 
1994, No. 16/2004 (June 19, 2004), art. 2(2).
41 Dégradation civique also was contemplated as an adjunct sentence (article 15 of the 2007 
amendments to the Organic Law).
42 The three subcategories of the second category referred to are as follows:
1° the well known murderer who distinguished himself or herself in the area where he 
or she lived or wherever he or she passed, because of the zeal which characterized him or 
her in the killings or excessive wickedness with which they were carried out, together 
with his or her accomplices
2° the person who committed acts of torture against others, even though they did not 
result into death, together with his or her accomplices;
3° the person who committed dehumanising acts on the dead body, together with his 
or her accomplices.
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b) a third (1/3) of the sentence is suspended;
c) half (1/2 ) of the sentence is commuted into community service
The ‘list’ is a list of individuals drawn up by the prosecutor for indictment. 
Clearly the intent is for persons to come forward and confess before being in-
vestigated or targeted by the prosecutor.
Community service was initially conceptualized as a way to promote recon-
ciliation and managerial ends while ensuring that a huge chunk of the work-
force was not idling away in prison but, rather, was put to use to motor the 
country’s post-conflict transition and also learn some practical skills. Commu-
nity service was thereby presented as a sentencing option that was less oner-
ous than imprisonment, and therefore served as an inducement to confess. 
Sanctions were established in the event of a convict’s failure to perform com-
munity service.43
In principle, community service could involve the convict going directly to 
the victims and offering labor or donating produce as recompense for the harms 
that had been inflicted – in other words, working to rebuild destroyed homes 
and farms, to till the land, and to ameliorate public services in the region. In 
practice, however, this would be mightily complex, entail significant monitor-
ing costs, and trigger poignant emotional reactions. Some survivors would not 
want the perpetrator around; service relationships would be difficult to super-
vise, control, and manage. So, in practice, the government instead began to fa-
vor broad community service projects – travaux d’intérêt général (tig) – and 
the use of labor camps. These projects involved agricultural work and building 
roads, houses, and infrastructure. The work was not specifically undertaken 
with specific connection to the place where the convicts had committed their 
crimes. It involved the convicts (also known as tigistes) working in groups.
Gacaca involved the local community sitting in judgment of persons ac-
cused of having committed mass atrocity within the same community. Gacaca 
43 Article 17 of the 2007 amendments provided penalties in case of default by the convicted 
person to properly carry out community service:
In case of default by the convicted person to properly carry out community service, 
the concerned person is taken back to prison to serve the remaining sentence in custody.
In that case, the Community Service Committee in the area where the convicted per-
son is carrying out community service shall prepare an ad hoc report and submit it to the 
Gacaca Court of the Sector where community service is perlodged which will fill in the 
form to return the defaulting person to prison.
In case this is not possible, that report shall be submitted to the Gacaca Court that 
tried the person serving his or her community service.
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judges were elders and “people of integrity” (Inyangamugayo) elected from 
 local communities throughout Rwanda. They were laypersons who received 
some limited legal training. One hundred and seventy thousand judges sat in 
approximately 10,000 panels in toto. These were composed at the lowest level 
(that of the cellule) of 9 judges with 5 deputies. There also were two higher 
levels of panels at the secteur and appellate levels (each of these two levels had 
about 1,500 panels). Suspects were to be brought to the villages where they 
were alleged to have committed their crimes. Practically speaking, the decen-
tralized nature of the gacaca process facilitated access to justice by reducing 
transportation costs (and language barriers) for witnesses and victims. At the 
proceedings, the public could raise issues – discursively – that exceeded the 
microscopic truths that would arise at trials. They could ask questions of sus-
pects, to which the suspects are permitted to reply. However, the judges were 
empowered to control the discussion, the flow of evidence, and maintain order 
at the proceedings. In the end, although the judges primarily adjudicated, they 
also acted as mediators to help the gathered community attain both legal and 
extra-legal goals. Defense lawyers were excluded, purportedly to ensure the 
open, participatory nature of the proceedings.
The Rwandan government created gacaca tribunals for several reasons. One 
was managerial, namely, to accommodate the sheer number of suspects. A sec-
ond reason was to diversify the legal response to genocide by invoking mecha-
nisms more steeped in reconciliation, reconstitution, and reintegration. This 
diversification, in theory at least, would depart from repression and retribu-
tion, a development which was deemed particularly appropriate for lower 
level offenders. Consequently, the Rwandan government touted both retribu-
tion and reconciliation as goals of gacaca adjudications; and the gacaca frame-
work noted the importance of penalties that permit convicts to “amend them-
selves” and reintegrate into Rwandan society.44 A third reason was simply to 
“disclose the truth,” although the gacaca process, whether traditional or in 
modified form for the genocide, is not a truth and reconciliation commis-
sion.45 A fourth reason pertained to sovereignty, namely the Rwandan govern-
ment’s perception that Rwanda needs to develop “by itself” solutions to the 
genocide and its consequences.46 A fifth reason was participatory – to open up 
a local democratic space for discussion and decision-making on issues that 
44 2004 Organic Law, supra note 40, pmbl (“Considérant qu’il importe de prévoir des peines 
permettant aux condamnés de s’amender et de favoriser leur réinsération dans la société 
rwandaise sans entrave à la vie normale de la population”). See also Tribunaux gacaca et 
travail d’intérêt general, 13–14 Reforme pénale et pénitentiaire en Afrique 1–2 
(mai 2001) (on file with author).
45 2004 Organic Law, supra note 40, pmbl.
46 Ibid.
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relate to the suspect, but also on a broader array of legal and non-legal matters 
that radiate from the genocide. In this sense, gacaca could promote what some 
have called “African-style democracy,” which envisions a “democracy built on 
such practices as consensus building and populist input [… which] begin at 
the village level.”47 In sum, gacaca’s purposes were broad, touching on the le-
gal, the social, and the political. This meant that the sharp due process cri-
tiques that many outsiders (in particular liberal legalists concerned with fair 
trial rights, provision of defense lawyers, and criteria of evidentiary admissibil-
ity) delivered against gacaca could be contextualized. Phil Clark puts it well:
[T]he dominant [international] discourse on gacaca is severely flawed 
for two main reasons: first, because it mistakenly views gacaca exclusive-
ly as a legal institution, which can be analysed solely through the legal 
statutes that underpin it; and second, because it interprets formal, deter-
rent justice as the only objective of gacaca, while neglecting more crucial 
aims, particularly reconciliation, and more negotiated processes during 
hearings. -In short, the dominant discourse fails to account for the hy-
brid nature of gacaca and the hybrid methods and objectives it embod-
ies. We therefore require a more nuanced interpretation of gacaca and 
its objectives if we are to offer more appropriate suggestions as to how 
gacaca may be reformed to aid its effectiveness as a tool of post-genocide 
reconstruction.48
The gacaca trials ended in 2012. Estimates vary wildly, but it is commonly not-
ed that approximately one million people went through the system.
5 Conclusion
Three layers of penal jurisdiction filled Rwandan post-conflict spaces. These 
were: the ictr, the national courts, and the neo-traditional gacaca. This chap-
ter has discussed each separately. But it is important to note that the three 
layers did not operate in parallel, but intersected in a variety of ways. In her 
2015 book, Courts in Conflict: Interpreting the Layers of Justice in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda, Nicola Palmer demonstrates how these different layers each were 
47 Matthew Todd Bradley, “The Other”: Precursory African Conceptions of Democracy, 7 Int’l 
Stud. Rev. 407, 413 (2005).
48 Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts 
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 animated by the pursuit of different goals.49 For example, Palmer finds that 
ictr judges and lawyers were motored by the consolidation and development 
of the jurisprudence of international criminal case-law. The national courts, 
she determines, were spirited by advancing judicial competence, credibility, 
independence, and domestic reform. And, finally, the many gacaca tribunals 
were animated by the goal of establishing local narratives of who did what to 
whom and why.
Insofar as manufacture of case-law serves as the primary ambition of the 
ictr, Palmer’s research intimates that the ictr may have strayed from its ini-
tial retributive, deterrent, and reconciliatory aspirations. While certainly inca-
pacitating the genocidal leadership, however, the ictr over time came to curry 
more of a bureaucratic function, to wit, creating a clarified body of law. The 
ictr’s legacy is not life in Rwanda, as Palmer notes, but the life of international 
law, the development of precedent, and the construction of persuasive author-
ity. The lack of congruence between the objectives of the ictr, on the one 
hand, and the two domestic systems (which themselves are incongruent) is a 
very valuable insight. Whether the intense turn to criminal law in the aftermath 
of the Rwandan genocide – regardless of the layer at which this occurred – 
attained retributive, deterrent or expressive goals remains debated. The same 
could certainly be said of the turn to penal law in the aftermath of any episode 
of massive human rights abuses.
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